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THE STATUS OF STATUTES CONTAINING
LEGISLATIVE VETO PROVISIONS AFTER
CHADHA-DOES THE EEOC HAVE THE
AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE EQUAL PAY
ACT AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT?
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, I the Supreme Court
decision invalidating the use of the legislative veto, has opened the door
for constitutional attacks on the more than 200 statutes containing legisla-
tive veto provisions. 2 The recent proliferation of litigation challenging the
authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to
enforce the Equal Pay Act3 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)4 illustrates the disruption and uncertainty engendered by the
Chadha decision. President Carter transferred enforcement responsibility
for these two Acts from the Secretary of Labor to the EEOC in 1978. 5
This transfer was authorized by the Reorganization Act of 1977,6 a statute
containing a legislative veto provision. 7 In suits by the EEOC to enforce
the two Acts, defendants are arguing that the presence of the legislative
1. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). The Supreme Court invalidated the use of the legislative veto in a
sweeping opinion by Chief Justice Burger. The Court reasoned that legislative vetoes constitute "leg-
islative activity" and must therefore conform to the requirements of article I. Id. at 2784-88. Justice
Powell concurred only in the judgment. Id. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring). He would have invali-
dated the specific veto involved in Chadha on the narrower ground that it was an unconstitutional
exercise of judicial power by Congress in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at
2789. He would not have reached the broader question of whether all legislative vetoes were uncon-
stitutional under article I. Id. at 2788-92. Justice White dissented on the ground that the legislative
veto was a constitutional exercise of congressional power. Id. at 2792-2816 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, dissented on the ground that the legislative veto provision
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982), was not severable from the remain-
der of the statute. 103 S. Ct. at 2816 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
For commentaries on the Chadha decision, see Hutchins, Legislative Vetoes and the Administra-
tive Process: A Constitutional and OperationalAnalysis, 15 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 307 (1984); Strauss,
Was There A Baby in the Bathvater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision,
1983 DUKE L.J. 789 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Separation of Powers, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 70, 185 (1983).
2. Strauss, supra note 1, at 789. For a partial listing of statutes containing legislative veto provi-
sions, see appendix I to Justice White's opinion in Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2811-12 (White, J., dis-
senting).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
4. Id. § 631 (1982).
5. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
216(c), 217 (1982)).
6. 5 U.S.C. §901-912 (1982).
7. Id. § 906(a).
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veto provision in the authorizing statute invalidated the transfer and left
the EEOC without enforcement authority.
Applying the Chadha decision to invalidate the EEOC's authority to
enforce the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act produces highly inequitable
results. Such an application seriously undermines the congressional pol-
icy against employment discrimination, threatens the EEOC's six years of
enforcement efforts, and impairs the rights of the individuals the statutes
were designed to protect.
District courts applying Chadha in this context have split three ways.
First, in EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Co. 8 the court held that the legisla-
tive veto provision in the 1977 Reorganization Act invalidates the
EEOC's authority to enforce the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act. 9 Second,
in Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC'0 and several other decisions'' courts
have held that the legislative veto provision is severable from the remain-
der of the Reorganization Act or that Congress has impliedly ratified the
transfer by its appropriations of funds. Under either rationale, these deci-
sions upheld the EEOC's authority to enforce the two Acts. 12 Finally,
rather than rely on severability or ratification, the district court in EEOC
v. Chrysler Corp.13 ruled that the Supreme Court's holding in Chadha
should not be applied retroactively to invalidate the transfer of enforce-
ment authority. 14
As the Muller Optical and Chrysler holdings demonstrate, the Chadha
decision need not disrupt the enforcement of these employment discrimi-
nation statutes. In order to minimize disruption of existing statutory
schemes generally, courts applying Chadha to statutes containing legisla-
tive veto provisions should use the following principles: (1) where possi-
ble, the courts should sever an unconstitutional legislative veto provision
from the remainder of the statute; (2) where administrative authority to
act is suspect because of the presence of a legislative veto provision, the
8. 570 F. Supp. 1224, 1232 (S.D. Miss. 1983).
9. Accord EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 7 LAB REL REP (BNA) (33 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas.) 1232. 1232 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 1984) (adopted Allstate holding).
10. 574 F. Supp. 946, 951-53 (W.D. Tenn. 1983).
11. Accord EEOC v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 7 LAB REL REP (BNA) (33 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas.) 1837, 1837-38 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 1984): EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 7 LAB REL REP (BNA) (34
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 257, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1984): EEOC v. City of Memphis, 7 LAB
REL. REP. (BNA) (33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1089, 1090-91 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 29, 1983): EEOC v.
Cudahy Foods Co.. 7 LAB REL REP (BNA) (33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1836, 1836 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 28, 1983); EEOC v. Jackson County, 7 LAB- REL REP- (BNA) (33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 963.
964 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 1983).
12. The only appellate court decision to date also found that the legislative veto provision was
severable from the Reorganization Act. EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188, 1191-92
(5th Cir. 1984).
13. 7 LAB REL. REP (BNA) (33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1838 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 1984).
14. Id. at 1842-43.
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courts should determine if Congress has impliedly ratified the grant and
thereby cured the defect; and (3) where possible, the courts should not
apply the Chadha rule retroactively. By applying these principles in the
EEOC litigation, the courts can effectuate the purposes behind the Cha-
dha rule without unduly disrupting the statutory scheme for combatting
employment discrimination.
After Chadha, the constitutional status of unexercised legislative veto
provisions, such as the one in the Reorganization Act of 1977, is uncer-
tain. Part I of this Note examines this uncertainty and concludes that
unexercised veto provisions should be held unconstitutional. Part II then
examines three possibile methods of limiting the Chadha decision to
avoid invalidating the EEOC's authority to enforce the Equal Pay Act and
the ADEA.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN UNEXERCISED
LEGISLATIVE VETO PROVISION
The district courts that have considered the EEOC's authority to en-
force the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act have assumed that the legislative
veto provision of the 1977 Reorganization Act' 5 was unconstitutional
even though the reorganization in question was never vetoed. The Cha-
dha decision did not directly address the constitutionality of an unex-
ercised veto provision. 16 The Court's holding, however, was broad: legis-
lative vetoes are legislative activity, and all legislative activity must meet
the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment. 17 The
Court's definition of legislative activity 18 seems to permit congressional
invalidation of executive or agency action only through a statute passed
by both houses of Congress and signed by the President, or passed by a
two-thirds majority of both houses. 19 The breadth of the Court's rationale
suggests that all legislative veto provisions are unconstitutional, whether
exercised or not.
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 901,906(a) (1982).
16. The Chadha Court emphasized that the exercise of the veto in Chadha was an essentially
legislative action because it "had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and rela-
tions of persons." 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2784 (1983). While the Court's emphasis on the veto as a legisla-
tive act by one house might seem to support the conclusion that an unexercised veto would not be
unconstitutional legislative action, that conclusion is contradicted by other portions of the Chadha
opinion and by the policy considerations. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
17. 103 S. Ct. at 2787; see infra note 79.
18. The Chadha Court indicated that legislative activity is activity having "the purpose and ef-
fect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons." 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
19. Indeed it has been argued that the Court's definition of "legislative activity" is so broad that
it encompasses much of Congress' business. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 1, at
191-92.
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The most plausible pre-Chadha argument in favor of the constitution-
ality of the legislative veto was that it is simply reverse legislation. 20 Ar-
guably, the executive or agency action constitutes a proposal for legisla-
tion, which Congress then enacts or affirms by failing to veto it. The
political branches retain power equivalent to that granted under article I,
and, as with the article I process, no legislation is enacted without the
consent of both houses of Congress and the President. 2 1
The Chadha majority, however, unequivocally rejected this argument:
"[T]o allow Congress to evade the strictures of the Constitution and in
effect enact Executive proposals into law by mere silence cannot be
squared with Art. 1. " 22 Thus, the majority rejected the enactment of non-
vetoed proposals by silence as well as the invalidation of a proposal by
the exercise of a legislative veto. The conclusion that the Court intended
this result is further evidenced by its failure to limit its holding, even
though well aware of the enormous implications for a great number of
statutes. 23
In addition, strong policy considerations support the conclusion that
unexercised legislative veto provisions are unconstitutional. 24 The legis-
lative veto has drawn criticism because it changes the relationship be-
tween Congress and the executive or agency making a given proposal.2 5
The legislative veto gives Congress an extraconstitutional negotiating
power, whether or not a veto is ever interposed. 26 One commentator has
suggested that a legislative veto provision makes agency action subject to
powerful constraints by members of Congress acting as "advisors" not
appointed by the executive. 27 This arguably violates the rule against con-
gressional appointment of executive officials.2 8 Additionally, because the
legislative veto power in reality centers in the congressional subcommit-
tees, it can be a method for concentrating power in the hands of a few
20. Justice White advanced this argument in his Chadha dissent. 103 S. Ct. at 2806-10. For a
discussion of the reverse legislation argument, see Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of
Powers: The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 423. 481-86 (1978).
21. The President has proposal power instead of veto power and either house of Congress can
block the measure not by failing to pass it (as with conventional legislation) but by vetoing it. There is
no equivalent of the President's veto power.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2788 n.22.
23. The Court's quotation of that portion of Justice White's dissent emphasizing the number of
legislative veto provisions inserted in statutes since 1932 demonstrates that the Court was aware of
the breadth of its holding. Id. at 2781 (quoting id. at 2811 (White, J., dissenting)).
24. The Supreme Court noted in Chadha that "the long range political wisdom of this 'inven-
tion' [the legislative veto] is arguable." Id. at 2781 (majority opinion).
25. Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA
L. REv 253, 267 (1982).
26. Dixon. supra note 20. at 445-48.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 445.
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legislators, rather than a tool for reasserting democratic control over the
bureaucracy. 29 Therefore, in order to avoid sanctioning a disruption in the
constitutionally determined balance of power between the legislative and
executive branches, legislative veto provisions should be held invalid
whether or not exercised.
II. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE CHADHA
DECISION TO THE TRANSFER OF ADEA AND EQUAL PAY
ACT ENFORCEMENT TO THE EEOC
A. The Severability of the Legislative Veto Provision from the
Reorganization Act of 1977
The district courts have split on the severability of the legislative veto
provision of the 1977 Reorganization Act30 from the remainder of the
statute. Some courts have held that the veto provision is severable from
the rest of the Act. 31 Other courts have held that the veto provision is
inseverable because Congress intended it to be an integral part of the
Act. 32
Prior to Chadha the Supreme Court had issued inconsistent statements
on the issue of severability. The most-cited Supreme Court opinion is
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission.33 In Champlin, the
Court indicated that an unconstitutional provision may be severed if what
is left is fully operative as law and there is no finding that Congress would
not have enacted the act without the severed provision. 34 This presump-
tion in favor of severability was modified in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,35
in which the Court stated that, in the absence of a severability provision,
the presumption is that the legislature enacts a statute as a whole and the
entire act falls if any of its provisions are held unconstitutional. 36 The
Champlin and Carter decisions seemingly established that: (1) where the
legislature inserted a severability provision, there would be a presumption
of severability; and (2) in the absence of such a provision there would be a
presumption against severability.
The presumption against severability was considerably weakened by
United States v. Jackson.37 Despite its earlier reliance on Congress' in-
29. Id. at 446.
30. 5 U.S.C. §§ 901, 906(a) (1982).
31. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
33. 286U.S. 210(1932).
34. Id. at 234.
35. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
36. Id. at 312.
37. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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clusion or omission of severability clauses, the Court stated that "the ulti-
mate determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or ab-
sence of such a clause.' '38 The Court in Jackson rejected Carter and
reiterated the language of Champlin, which created a presumption of
severability absent a finding that the legislature would not have enacted
the statute without the unconstitutional provision. 39 Furthermore, in the
recent case of Buckley v. Valeo,40 and in Chadha itself,41 the Court again
quoted Champlin, and held the unconstitutional provisions severable
from their statutes. Thus, the Court has indicated a preference for the
Champlin test of severability.
It is unlikely that Congress would have enacted the 1977 Reorganiza-
tion Act without a legislative veto provision. Congress has consistently
inserted legislative veto provisions in Reorganization Acts. In fact, the
legislative veto originated in the first Reorganization Act of 1932,42 and
Congress has insisted upon the veto in every Reorganization Act but one
since then. 43 Congress placed a veto provision in the 1977 Act even
though aware of its possible unconstitutionality. 44 Indeed, in the House
report, the veto provision was termed the "key provision" of the bill. 45
Furthermore, even though aware of the constitutional questions surround-
ing the legislative veto, Congress chose not to include a severability pro-
vision in the 1977 Reorganization Act. 46
38. Id. at 585 n.27.
39. Id. at 585.
40. 424 U.S. 1, 108-09(1976).
41. 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2774 (1983).
42. Ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414. President Hoover requested authority in 1929 to reorga-
nize the executive branch subject to a "power of revision" by Congress. That authority was granted
subject to the first legislative veto provision. See Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administra-
tive Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies. 75 Nw- U.L. REV
1064, 1089 n.74 (1981).
43. President Roosevelt was granted reorganization authority for a two-year period under a stat-
ute not containing a veto provision, but still subject to the requirement that a proposed reorganization
should lie before Congress for 60 days before taking effect. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 212, § 407, 47
Stat. 1489, 1519. However, when this authority was renewed, a veto provision was inserted. Reorga-
nization Act of 1939, ch. 36, § 5, 53 Stat. 561, 562-63.
The Reorganization Acts of 1939, 1945, 1949, and 1977 all contained legislative veto provisions.
Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, § 5, 53 Stat. 561, 562-63; Reorganization Act of 1945, ch. 582.
§ 6. 59 Stat. 613, 616; Reorganization Act of 1949. ch. 226, § 6, 63 Stat. 203, 205; Reorganization
Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1982).
44. Representative Brooks, one of the sponsors of the 1977 Reorganization Act, favored a bill
with no legislative veto provision because of the constitutional questions involved. H.R. REP No
105, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-38 (1977). For remarks by other members of Congress who viewed the
veto as unconstitutional, see 123 CONG. REC. 9351 (Rep. Walker) (1977); id. at 9351-52 (Rep. Dri-
nan) (1977).
45. H.R. REP No 105, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 17(1977).
46. As the Allstate court noted, the only severability provision considered was directed to limit-
ing the courts' power to grant relief to a holding that a single reorganization plan, rather than all plans
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The scope of delegation under the 1977 Reorganization Act explains
why Congress was so adamant about maintaining legislative veto power.
The reorganization authority delegated under the Act was broad, enabling
the President to make major changes in the structure and functioning of
the executive branch. Additionally, it would have been difficult for Con-
gress to overturn, through legislation, a reorganization by the President.
By the time Congress could have mobilized both houses to disapprove a
presidential reorganization, and possibly override a presidential veto, the
reorganization would likely be a fait accompli. At that point, legislative
reversal of the reorganization might involve substantial disruption of the
executive branch. With a legislative veto provision, however, Congress
could quickly review the President's reorganization without having to
balance a decision to disapprove it against such disruption. In short, be-
cause Congress was determined to maintain a veto over the President's
broad reorganization authority, it probably would not have enacted the
1977 Reorganization Act without the legislative veto provision. There-
fore, under Champlin and the cases following it, the legislative veto
should be held inseverable from the remainder of the Act.
B. Congressional Ratification of the Transfer of ADEA andEqual Pay
Act Enforcement to the EEOC
There are two distinct ratification arguments. The first argument, made
by Justice White in his Chadha dissent, treats Congress' failure to veto an
executive or agency action as ratification of that action. 47 This argument
was rejected by the Chadha majority. 48 The second argument, which ap-
pears in Muller Optical and the cases in accord with it, 4 9 treats Congress'
subsequent appropriations for the performance of an action as ratification
of that action. 50
The Supreme Court has held that Congress may, through appropria-
formulated under the Reorganization Act, was unconstitutional. EEOC v. Allstate, 570 F. Supp.
1224, 1231 (S.D. Miss. 1983). The discussion of that amendment, which was not adopted, did not
even address whether the one-house veto should be severed from the Act. 123 CONG. REc. 9363-65
(1977).
47. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2807-08 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White correctly
noted that the Court recently has accorded weight to Congress' failure to act in a given area. See,
e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2033 (1982), which Justice White cited in
support of the proposition. His argument, however, is predicated on the "reverse legislation" con-
cept rejected by the Chadha majority and thus cannot succeed in light of the Chadha holding. See
supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2787-88 n.22.
49. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
50. The district courts relied on Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 301
(1937), and Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139, 147 (1937).
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tions acts, ratify what it might have authorized. 51 The Court has cau-
tioned, however, that the appropriation must plainly show a purpose to
grant the precise authority which is claimed. 52 Since the 1978 reorganiza-
tion, Congress has appropriated money to the EEOC for the enforcement
of the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act, giving the EEOC the authority to
enforce the two Acts. 53
Nevertheless, the district courts have split on the question of congres-
sional ratification of the EEOC's authority to enforce the ADEA and the
Equal Pay Act. The Muller Optical line of cases held that Congress had
ratified the President's transfer of ADEA enforcement to the EEOC. 54 In
deciding that the authority of the President to transfer the functions of one
administrative agency to another could be ratified by Congress' subse-
quent appropriations, the Muller Optical court relied on Isbrandtsen-
Moller Co. v. United States. 55 Allstate and Chrysler were among the
cases holding against congressional ratification of the enforcement au-
thority. 56 In rejecting the ratification argument, the Allstate court relied
on Greene v. McElroy.57
The Allstate court did not discuss Isbrandtsen-Moller and misapplied
Greene. In Greene the Supreme Court held that congressional authoriza-
tion of constitutionally suspect action must be expressly given. 58 In con-
51. Isbrandtsen-Moller, 300 U.S. at 147.
52. ExparteMitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 303 n.24(1944).
53. Two recent acts appropriated money to the EEOC to enforce the ADEA. Act of Dec. 21,
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830, 1874 (1982); Act of Dec. 15, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-92, 95
Stat. 1183, 1192 (1981). The Act of Dec. 21, 1982 also explicitly appropriated money for EEOC
enforcement of the Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830, 1874 (1982).
54. Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 574 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Tenn. 1983). See supra notes 10-11
and accompanying text.
55. Muller Optical, 574 F. Supp. at 953-54. In Isbrandtsen-Moller, 300 U.S. 139, 147 (1937),
the plaintiff contended that the abolition of the Shipping Board and the transfer of its functions to the
Department of Commerce were invalid because not properly authorized by Congress. The Supreme
Court held that whatever doubt existed as to the validity of the transfer, and the President's authority
to effectuate it, was resolved because Congress recognized the validity of the transfer and ratified the
President's action by appropriating funds to the Department of Commerce to carry out the provisions
of the Shipping Act. Id..
56. See EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224, 1232 (S.D. Miss. 1983); EEOC v.
Chrysler Corp., LAB REL. REP (BNA) (33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1838, 1840-41 (E.D. Mich. Jan.
23, 1984). The Chrysler court rejected the ratification argument on the ground that the subsequent
legislation did not show a sufficient legislative intent to ratify the transfer.
57. Allstate, 570 F. Supp. at 1234 (citing Greene, 360 U.S. 474 (1959)).
58. Greene, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959). The issue considered in Greene was whether the Depart-
ment of Defense had the implied authority to revoke the plaintiff's security clearance, resulting in his
loss of employment, in a proceeding in which he had no opportunity to confront and cross-examine
those whose statements reflected badly on him. The Court held that the plaintiff's fifth amendment
liberty and property rights were implicated, and that authority to take actions within the area of ques-
tionable constitutionality must be explicitly delegated by Congress because such action "requires
careful and purposeful consideration by those responsible for enacting and implementing our laws."
Id. at 506-07.
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trast, EEOC enforcement of the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act raises no
constitutional questions, assuming proper congressional authorization.
The Allstate court's position that the EEOC's original authorization to
enforce the Act was constitutionally suspect is clearly question-begging.
It is precisely the constitutional infirmity of the Reorganization Act that
makes it necessary to take up the ratification question at all. 59 The Allstate
court failed to recognize that the Supreme Court refused to find an im-
plied authorization in Greene because the action for which such authori-
zation was sought was constitutionally suspect. Here, however, the action
involved the transfer of administrative functions from one governmental
agency to another, does not involve any constitutional questions. 60 There-
fore, the courts should uphold the congressional ratification of EEOC en-
forcement of the Equal Pay Act and the ADEA.
C. Retroactive Application of the Chadha Rule
The Supreme Court has formulated a three-pronged test for determin-
ing when a holding in a civil case should not be applied retroactively. 61
First, the decision must establish a new rule of law, either by overruling
past precedent or by deciding a question of first impression. Second, in
light of the purpose and effect of the new rule, the court must determine
whether retroactive application would further or retard its operation.
Third, the court must consider whether retroactive application of the new
rule would produce substantial inequitable results.
When the Supreme Court decides that a law-changing decision will not
be applied retroactively, it usually does so by making a general determi-
nation applicable to all situations. 62 A general determination of whether
or not to apply Chadha retroactively, however, would require evaluating
its impact on approximately 200 legislative veto provisions. Such an un-
dertaking is beyond the scope of this Comment. Indeed, one court has
indicated that because of the difficulty involved in formulating a uniform
rule, the Chadha decision should be analyzed for retroactive application
on a case-by-case basis. 63 The following analysis of the legislative veto
provision in the 1977 Reorganization Act64 indicates that retroactive ap-
plication is not suitable for the Chadha holding in this situation.
59. Allstate, 570 F. Supp. at 1233-34.
60. See Muller Optical, 574 F. Supp. at 954.
61. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1971).
62. See generally Annot., 65 L. Ed. 2d 1219, 1242-48 (1980).
63. EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 7 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1838, 1843
n.4.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1982).
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1. The Chadha Decision Establishes a New Rule of Law
The first prong of the Supreme Court test requires that, to be applied
prospectively only, a holding must establish a new rule of law. 65 Chadha
clearly establishes a new rule of law. The Supreme Court had not previ-
ously ruled on the constitutionality of the legislative veto. There was no
consensus among the lower courts that the legislative veto was unconsti-
tutional. 66 The extensive commentary on the veto was split on the ques-
tion of its constitutionality. 67 Congress, by using the veto for fifty years,
indicated its view that the device was constitutional. 68 The Supreme
Court has indicated that where the Court invalidates the prevailing statu-
tory norm, as it did in Chadha, the "new rule of law" requirement is
satisfied. 69
65. A decision can establish anew rule of law either by overruling past precedent or by deciding
an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).
66. The first federal court to decide the question upheld the constitutionality of the veto before it.
Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). It was
not until 1980. after approximately 50 years of use, that a legislative veto provision was held uncon-
stitutional in the federal courts. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th
Cir. 1980), affd. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
67. Justice White in his Chadha dissent, 103 S. Ct. at 2797 n. 12, cited the commentary on the
legislative veto. The following are generally favorable to the legislative veto: Abourezk, Congressio-
nal Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogative, 52 IND
L.J. 323 (1977): Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEo. WASH L.
REV 467 (1962): Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional
Analysis. 52 N.Y.U. L. REV 455 (1977); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the
Constitutional Framework, 52 IND L.J. 367 (1977); Nathanson, supra note 42; Newman & Keaton.
Congress and the Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?, 41
CALIF- L. REV 565 (1953): Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function, 23 U.
KAN L. REV 277 (1975), Rodino, Congressional Review of Executive Actions, 5 SETON HALL 489
(1974); Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: 1. The American
Experience, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV 1031 (1955).
The following are generally unfavorable to the legislative veto: Bruff & Gellhom, Congressional
Control of Admninistrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv L. REV. 1369 (1977):
Dixon, supra note 20; 56 N.C.L. REV. 423 (1978): Ginaane, The Control of Federal Administration
by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV L. REV 569 (1953); Martin, The Legisla-
tive Veto and The Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV 253 (1982); Wat-
son, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF L. REV 983
(1975): Note, Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The Probable Response to a Constitu-
tional Challenge, 1976 DUKE L.J. 285; Recent Developments, The Legislative Veto in the Arms
ControlAct of 1976, 9 LAW & POL'Y INTTL Bus- 1029 (1977).
68. The Supreme Court has indicated that congressional judgments as to the constitutionality of a
statute are entitled to some weight. In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.. 458
U.S. 50 (1982), the Court indicated that the fact that Congress chose to vest broad jurisdiction in the
bankruptcy courts, after substantial consideration of the constitutional questions involved, was reason
to respect the congressional conclusion of constitutionality. Id. at 61. The Court. however, held the
legislation unconstitutional. See infra note 74.
69. See, for example, United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1975). where the Court
stated that
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The only courts to address the retroactivity issue, in the Chrysler and
Allstate decisions, reached conflicting results. The Chrysler court cor-
rectly held that the Chadha decision formulated a new rule of law. 70 Be-
cause the Allstate court misunderstood the first prong of the retroactivity
test, it held that Chadha was not a law-changing decision. 71
The Allstate court erred in three respects in formulating its holding.
First, it indicated that Allstate was not a new rule of law. 72 The question
before the court, however, was whether Chadha, not Allstate, presented a
new rule of law. Second, the Allstate court suggested that congressional
awareness of the constitutional questions surrounding the legislative veto
foreshadowed the Chadha decision. 73 The Supreme Court has indicated,
however, that such congressional awareness should not be considered in
determining whether or not a decision has been foreshadowed. 74 Finally,
the Allstate court understood the Supreme Court's silence on the issue of
retroactivity, in the face of the Court's recognition that the Chadha deci-
sion would have far-reaching effect, as evidence that Chadha should be
applied retroactively. 75 The court's rationale is faulty. The majority of the
Supreme Court's decisions not to apply a case retroactively were reached
not in the law-changing case itself, but in a later case. 76 This is true even
since the parties acknowledge that Almeida-Sanchez was the first [such] case to be decided by
this Court, unless we are to hold that parties may not reasonably rely upon any legal pronounce-
ment emanating from sources other than this Court, we cannot regard as blameworthy those
parties who conform their conduct to the prevailing statutory or constitutional norm.
70. EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 7 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1838, 1843
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 1984).
71. EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224, 1233 (S.D. Miss. 1983).
72. Addressing the first criterion, the Allstate court stated:
[T]his is not a case of first impression and the decision of this Court was definitely foreshadowed
by prior events. Not only has the Supreme Court acted in Chadha, but it has been obvious in a
review of the legislative history that Congress was well aware that such a decision might ulti-
mately invalidate their [sic] use of the one-house veto scheme.
570 F. Supp. at 1233.
73. Id.
74. In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the Court
held that the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982), violated article III. It then held that
the decision would be applied prospectively only. The Court attached no particular significance to the
fact that the House of Representatives had expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of provisions
eventually included in the Act. 458 U.S. at 61 n. 12. In fact, the Court indicated that the congressio-
nal opinion of constitutionality was entitled to some deference. See supra note 68 and accompanying
text.
75. Allstate, 570 F. Supp. at 1233.
76. In some instances the Supreme Court decided the retroactivity question in the law-changing
decision itself. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 88. It has been more common, however, for
the court to address the retroactivity issue in a later case. See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97 (1971) (denying retroactive application to Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S.
352 (1969)); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (denying retroactive appliction to United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)); Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (denying retroactive application to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
559
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of decisions with "far-reaching effects." ' 77 Therefore, the fact that the
Court did not address the retroactivity issue in Chadha is not evidence
that Chadha should be applied retroactively.
2. The Purpose and Effect of the Chadha Rule
The Supreme Court has indicated that the most important criterion for
determining the retroactivity question is whether the history, purpose,
and effect of the new rule would be better served by prospective-only, or
prospective and retroactive application. 78 The Court in Chadha clearly
delineated the purposes of the rule it formulated. 79 The Court stressed that
the article I process for enacting legislation serves important purposes in
maintaining the balance of power and separation of powers doctrines
which underlie our system of government. The Court indicated that legis-
lative activity must comply with article I to ensure that the checks and
balances envisioned by the Constitution are not eroded. 80
In the context of Reorganization Plan No. 1,81 the purposes of the Cha-
dha rule would not be furthered by retroactive application. When Presi-
dent Carter transferred enforcement authority of the Equal Pay Act and
the ADEA to the EEOC, no veto was interposed. Therefore, Congress
took no legislative action inconsistent with the requirements of article I.
Applying Chadha retroactively would have deleterious effects on the stat-
(1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)). For an argument that the Supreme Court
should procedurally revamp the way in which it handles the retroactivity issue, see Beytagh, Ten
Years ofNon-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1612-25 (1975).
77. Certainly Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), holding that accused persons must be
informed of their fifth amendment rights before any statements may be used against them, was a
decision with far-reaching effects. However, the Court did not address the retroactivity issue in Mi-
randa itself, but rather in the later case of Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
78. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,249 (1969).
79. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2782-84. Citing its own prior decisions and writings of the Framers,
the Court noted that the presentment clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3, serve three purposes:
First. to circumscribe Congress' power and enable the Executive to defend itself against that power;
second, to discourage the passage of bad legislation through haste, inadvertence, or design; and third.
to assure that the national perspective of the President as a representative of the people is maintained
in the legislative process. 103 S. Ct. at 2782-83. The Court also indicated that the purposes of the
presentment clauses are interdependent with the purposes of the bicameralism requirement. U.S.
CONST art. 1, §§ I, 7. The Court identified those as: First, to reemphasize the second purpose of the
presentment clauses, namely, to encourage that legislation is fully and carefully considered before
passage; second, to restrain the legislature in order to avert the threat of despotism; and third, to
ensure that neither the larger nor the smaller states impose their will unduly on the other. 103 S. Ct. at
2783-84. The Court concluded that "the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ I, 7 repre-
sents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure." Id. at 2784.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 2787-88.
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utory scheme against employment discrimination. 82 The unexercised veto
provision has a relatively small impact on the legislative process. 83 Thus,
in the context of Reorganization Plan No. 1, prospective-only application
of the Chadha rule would effectuate the purposes behind the rule without
causing unnecessary disruption of the statutory scheme. 84
3. Retroactive Application of the Chadha Rule Would Be Inequitable
The third prong of the retroactivity test determines whether retroactive
82. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
83. Even the commentators who have argued that an unexercised veto provision detrimentally
affects the legislative process, see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text, find the veto least
objectionable in the "reverse legislation" category into which the Reorganizati6n Acts fall. See su-
pra notes 20-21 and accompanying text; Dixon, supra note 20, at 481-86. One commentator argues
that in the Reorganization Act context:
The Congressional veto . . . does not interfere with the administrative process of executing
public law. It merely checks the President's authority to propose what may be regarded as
amendments to the existing statute-based structure of the executive branch. ... [There is not]
any tampering with the authorized administrative discretion in a continuous program.
Id. at 484.
84. The courts, however, still need to determine the degree of prospective application. For a
discussion of the various degrees of prosepctivity which the Supreme Court has utilized, see Annot.,
65 L. Ed. 2d 1219, 1242-50 (1980). There are two possibilities: (1) apply the Chadha rule to all
cases at a certain stage in the judicial process, see id. at 1243-48, or (2) apply the Chadha rule to all
legislative vetoes enacted or exercised after a certain "cut-off" date, see id. at 1248-50. The first
possibility is commonly used in criminal cases, where the courts are concerned about the effects of
retroactive application of new constitutional rights to those whose convictions are final. See, e.g.,
Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Angelet v.
Fay, 381 U.S. 654 (1965). These concerns do not apply in the legislative veto context. The second
possibility, therefore, should apply to Chadha. While the Court has summarily affirmed two lower
court decisions invalidating the legislative veto, Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy
Council, 103 S. Ct. 2556 (1983), ajf'g Consumer Energy Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir.
1982), this does not preclude the Court from later deciding not to apply the Chadha rule retroactively.
The issue of retroactivity was not addressed in those cases. The Supreme Court has previously held
that the application of a law-changing decision to cases on direct review, with no discussion of retro-
activity principles, does not preclude it from later applying the law-changing decision retroactively.
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536 n.5 (1975). Applying Chadha prospectively-only would
ensure that, in the future, legislative vetoes will not be exercised in contravention of the article I
requirements, without implicating the 200-plus existing statutes containing veto provisions. This is
not an insignificant effect because Congress has continued to enact legislative veto provisions in the
wake of the Chadha decision. See Granat, Inside Congress: Legislative Vetoes are Passed Despite
High Court Decision, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Oct. 29, 1983, at 2235.
Of course, vetoes exercised before the "cut-off" date would be unreachable. However, in most
situations where a veto was exercised, the executive or agency has resolved the situation by adopting
different proposals or regulations more acceptable to Congress. Therefore, the number of exercised
vetoes which would be challenged in the courts, even if Chadha were granted full retroactive applica-
tion, is small. Furthermore, were the courts to give effect to a vetoed proposal, Congress would likely
either invalidate the proposal by passing a statute to that effect, or refuse to appropriate money for the
proposal.
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application would impose inequities on any party. 85 Applying the Chadha
rule to invalidate the transfer of Equal Pay Act and ADEA enforcement to
the EEOC would impose serious inequities on the parties protected by
these two validly enacted statutes. 86 Additionally, such an application
would frustrate Congress' intent to prohibit employment discrimination,
would considerably impair governmental enforcement efforts, and would
benefit discriminatory employers, who could use the Chadha decision to
avoid compliance with the Equal Pay Act and the ADEA.
The Allstate court stated that "there are no individual cases in which
retroactive application of this decision would produce inequitable results.
The Equal Pay Act includes a provision for individuals to sue in their own
right." 87 The court, however, ignored the fact that, as in Allstate, a citi-
zen suit is precluded by the initiation of a government suit. 88 The holding
that the EEOC does not have the authority to enforce the Equal Pay Act
and the ADEA will mean at the least a substantial delay for any employee
who has been precluded from suing by the government suit. More seri-
ously, some plaintiffs may find their claims time-barred if they were pre-
cluded from suing during the two-year limitation period 89 by a govern-
ment suit. A significant delay in, or bar of, the enforcement of a validly
created statutory right certainly constitutes an inequitable result.
Similar inequities will obtain in ADEA enforcement if the Allstate
rather than Chrysler decision is followed. For instance, under the ADEA
a private party cannot file a suit until sixty days after reporting any viola-
tion to the EEOC, and then only if a government suit is not initiated. 90
Thus, the problems of delay and time bar are as significant under the
ADEA 91 as under the Equal Pay Act. Furthermore, a government suit
cannot be commenced until informal methods of conciliation, confer-
ence, and persuasion have been attempted by the enforcing agency. 92
This presents the added problem of enforcing the informal conciliation
efforts. The EEOC has conducted such conciliation efforts since 1978
85. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971).
86. The court in EEOC v. Chrysler Corp. found that [tIhe most compelling reason to deny
retroactive application [of the Chadha decision] is that it would be extremely unfair to the individual
claimants in this suit to do so." 7 LAB REL REP (BNA) (33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1838, 1843
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 1984).
87. EEOC v. Allstate, 570 F. Supp. 1224, 1233 (S.D. Miss. 1983). The citizen suit provision is
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
88. There are three enforcement provisions in the Equal Pay Act: (I) a citizen suit under 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). (2) a government suit at citizen request under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c), and (3) a
government injunctive suit under 29 U.S.C. § 217. Suit by the government under either § 216(c) or §
217 precludes the employee from suing. Id.
89. Id. § 255(a).
90. Id. § 626(d).
91. The ADEA is also subject to a two-year statute of limitations. id. § 255(a).
92. Id. § 626(b).
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and, logically, if the EEOC had no such authority, employers would be
free to repudiate all agreements reached through the EEOC's efforts for
the last six years. Such a result would be highly inequitable. Yet, this
may be the effect of the Allstate holding.
The inequities that would result from invalidating EEOC enforcement
of the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act suggest that the courts should not
apply the Chadha holding retroactively in this context. Furthermore, the
Chadha decision should be analyzed for prospective-only application in
all cases involving unexercised legislative veto provisions.
In the context of the transfer of ADEA and Equal Pay Act enforcement
to the EEOC, the Chadha decision meets all three of the requirements
established by the Supreme Court for prospective-only application. It es-
tablished a new rule of law, overturning the legislative veto which had
been used for fifty years under the prevailing statutory norm prior to the
Chadha decision. The purpose of the Chadha rule, ensuring compliance
with the article I process for enacting legislation, would not be furthered
by retroactive application in this context because no veto was ever inter-
posed against the transfer of authority to the EEOC. Finally, it would be
extremely inequitable to apply the Chadha rule retroactively in such a
way as to impair the statutory rights of the aggrieved individuals the
ADEA and the Equal Pay Act were designed to protect.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in Chadha, and the relevant policy con-
siderations, compel the conclusion that legislative veto provisions should
be held unconstitutional, even where unexercised. The disruption of the
statutory scheme caused by such a holding can and should be minimized
in several ways. First, the courts should determine whether the unconsti-
tutional veto provision is severable from the statute involved. If not sever-
able, the courts should consider the possibility that Congress has ratified
the executive or administrative action, even though the initial authoriza-
tion was suspect because of the presence of a legislative veto provision.
Finally, the courts should analyze the Chadha decision for prospective-
only application using the principles the Supreme Court has developed.
The courts should determine whether prospective-only application would
further the purpose and effect of the Chadha rule by ensuring future
compliance with the demands of article I, without unnecessarily and ine-
quitably disrupting the existing statutory scheme.
Applying these provisions to the EEOC litigation indicates that the
EEOC's authority to enforce the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act should
nonetheless be upheld. There are two bases for such a holding: Congress
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ratified the EEOC's enforcement of the two acts through appropriations;
and the Chadha rule should not be applied retroactively in this context.
Tracy Pool
